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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellant, : 
v. 
ERNESTO ALVEREZ : Case No. 20040059-CA 
Defendant/Appellant 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Appellant/Defendant Ernesto Alverez ("Mr. Alverez" or "Appellant") appeals 
from the denial of his Motion to Suppress Illegally Obtained Evidence, entered by the 
Honorable Paul G. Maughn, Third District Court, Salt Lake County, Utah. A copy of the 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order denying Appellant's Motion to Dismiss 
is in Addendum A. This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (2002). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE, STANDARD OF REVIEW, PRESERVATION 
Mr. Alverez filed a Motion to Suppress the illegally obtained evidence acquired 
when officers exceeded the scope of their detention without reasonable articulable 
suspicion and then proceeded to forcibly conduct a warrantless search of Mr. Alverez 
without probable cause or exigent circumstances. 
Issue. Whether the trial court erred in denying Mr. Alverez's motion to suppress 
evidence, where the officers engaged in a level-two seizure without reasonable 
articulable suspicion and ultimately conducted an unlawful, warrantless search? 
Standard of Review: The applicable standard is bifurcated. "The factual findings 
of a trial court that underlie its decision to grant or deny a motion to suppress will not be 
disturbed on appeal unless clearly erroneous." State v. Davis. 821 P.2d 9, 11 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1991); Salt Lake City v. Rav, 2000 UT App 55, f 8, 998 P.2d 274. The trial court's 
legal conclusions are reviewed for correctness, where "the appellate court decides the 
matter for itself and does not defer in any degree to the trial judge's determination of 
law." State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 19941 abrogated in part by Campbell v. 
State Farm Mut. Auto Ins., Co., 2001 UT 89, f 13, 432 Utah Adv. Rep. 44. 
Preservation. This issue was preserved below. R. 32-34,35-40, 44-46, 62-69, 88. 
TEXT OF RELEVANT RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The text of the following rules and constitutional provisions are in Addendum B: 
U.S. Const, amend. IV; 
Utah Code Ann. §77-7-15 (2003). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On June 26, 2003, Mr. Alverez was charged with two counts of Unlawful 
Possession of a Controlled Substance or Counterfeit Substance with the Intent to 
Distribute, second degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 5 8-3 7-8( 1 )(a)(iii) 
(2002). R. 1-2. On August 13, 2003, Mr. Alverez filed a motion to suppress the 
illegally obtained evidence. R. 32-34. 
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On August 29, 2003, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing on Mr. Alverez's 
motion to suppress. R. 42-43; 88. After the state presented evidence, the trial court 
denied the motion to suppress. R. 43-46; 88:38. On October 17, 2003, Mr. Alverez 
filed a petition for interlocutory review of the trial court's denial of his motion to 
suppress. R. 47-48; 54-59; 88:39. On November 26, 2003, this Court denied Mr. 
Alverez's petition for interlocutory review. R. 56. 
On January 5, 2004, Mr. Alverez entered into a conditional guilty plea pursuant to 
State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), wherein he pled guilty to one count of 
unlawful possession of a controlled/counterfeit substance with the intent to distribute, a 
second degree felony offense. R. 62-71. Mr. Alverez and the state specifically agreed 
that Mr. Alverez's f,[p]lea [was] conditional to allow [an] appeal of [the trial court's 
denial] of [the] motion to suppress." R. 67. Mr. Alverez was sentenced to an 
indeterminate term of 1 to 15 years in prison. R. 70. The trial court suspended the prison 
term upon Mr. Alverez serving 30 days in jail. R. 71. As a condition of probation, Mr. 
Alverez was released to Immigration and Naturalization Service for deportation. R. 71. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On August 29, 2003, a motion to suppress hearing was held in the above-entitled 
case. R. 42-43; 88. During the hearing, the following evidence was presented. 
On June 23, 2003, Officer Don Walling and another officer, with the Salt Lake 
City Police Department, were observing a condominium complex (complex) on 2450 
3 
Elizabeth Street because they had heard there were drug dealings in this general area.1 R. 
88:3-4, 9. The officers did not have any specific information that drug dealings were 
going on in this particular complex but were taking "a chance that day to see if anything 
was going to come in and out of there." R. 88:9. While observing the complex, the 
officers saw a vehicle pull up. R. 88:4. Walling and the other officer recognized this 
vehicle as one listed in a narcotics department report as "possibly dealing drugs." R. 
88:3. Someone had called to report alleged drug sales near their residence around 2 nd 
South and Douglas Street and reported observing this vehicle in that area. R. 88:10. Mr. 
Alverez got out of the vehicle, went into the complex and in less than five minutes 
returned to the vehicle and left. R. 88:4. Walling believed a drug transaction occurred 
because this visit was consistent with short-stay drug traffic. R. 88:4, 10. Although 
Walling thought a drug transaction had occurred he did not observe a moving violation 
allowing him to make a traffic stop. R. 88:10-11. Walling could have made a stop based 
on his knowledge that the vehicle did not have insurance but his squad has "advised with 
cases such as this that we're better off [basing a stop on] an equipment... or moving 
violation." R. 88:18-19. 
The next day, on June 24th, Walling and Sergeant Chad Steed, also with the Salt 
!The probable cause statement indicates that the complex's address is 2430 South 
Elizabeth Street instead of 2450 as indicated in the motion to suppress hearing. R.2 To 
the extent that this number represents the whole condominium complex, the address is 
cited as given in the motion to suppress hearing. 
4 
Lake City Police Department, were observing the complex to see whether this same 
vehicle would return. R. 88:3, 21. Walling and Steed, observed the vehicle pull into the 
same area of the complex and Mr. Alverez get out and walk somewhere into the 
complex. R. 88:4, 21. Walling and Steed could not see what area or which unit in the 
complex Mr. Alverez was going to. R. 88:13, 15, 32. Nor did Walling or Steed try to 
ascertain which unit Mr. Alverez was going to. R. 88:13-15, 32. Instead, Walling and 
Steed pulled their unmarked vehicle around to where the vehicle Mr. Alverez was 
driving was parked. R. 88:4, 21,31. Walling and Steed got out of their vehicle and 
waited next to the vehicle Mr. Alverez was driving to see whether he would return in the 
same manner as previously observed. R. 88:4, 21,31. Steed testified that they chose to 
confront Mr. Alverez as he tried to get into his vehicle rather than attempt to stop him for 
an insurance violation because "it was [their] belief [from his experience] with 
individuals where [they] attempt to make a traffic stop and [individuals] don't 
immediately come to a stop but drive down the road and swallow water and thus conceal 
evidence." R. 88:32-33. In addition, their "department has a non-pursuit policy which 
wouldn't allow [them] to chase a person had they decided not to stop once they've 
entered the vehicle." R. 88:33. Steed testified that he did not have any particular reason 
to believe that Mr. Alverez would run from them because during their contact Mr. 
Alverez was compliant, polite, and non-threatening. R. 88:33. 
While waiting for Mr. Alverez to return, Steed noticed "a small bottle of water in 
5 
the console of the vehicle" which Steed has "seen [individuals believed to have 
narcotics] use . . . to swallow drugs that they contain in their mouths." R. 88:29. Steed 
also observed a facsimile of "Jesus Malverde" which Steed has seen before in drug 
houses and "[according to the people that [he had] talked to [Jesus Malverde is] the 
patron saint of drug dealing." R. 88:22, 29. However, during voir dire Steed was unable 
to distinguish Malverde from other male Catholic imagery, other than Christ. R. 88:28. 
Walling and Steed stood next to the vehicle behind a full-size van waiting for Mr. 
Alverez to return to his vehicle. R. 88:5-6, 15, 21. As Mr. Alverez approached the 
vehicle, Walling and Steed "came around the van" to confront him. R. 88:5-6, 15, 21. 
Both Walling and Steed were wearing uniforms. R. 88:2. "Initially, when [Walling] 
stopped [Mr. Alverez he] asked him if he knew the vehicle that he was driving was 
uninsured." R. 88:6, 15-16. Mr. Alverez responded "How'd you know that?" R. 88:6, 
16. Walling "then went on to explain to [Mr. Alverez] that this vehicle that he was 
driving had been suspected of being a vehicle involved in some drug dealing activities." 
R. 88:6, 16. Mr. Alverez "stated he knew nothing of that." R. 88:6. Walling then 
proceeded to ask Mr. Alverez "if he had any drugs on his person." R. 88:6, 16. Mr. 
Alverez responded "No." R. 88:6, 17. While talking with Mr. Alverez, Walling did not 
have difficulty understanding him nor did he notice any unsightly or unusual bulges in 
Mr. Alverez's mouth. R. 88:16. In fact, Walling thought Mr. Alverez "talked quite well" 
and did not notice Mr. Alverez doing anything he would consider unusual. R. 88:16-17, 
6 
19. Walling "then asked [Mr. Alverez] if he minded opening up his mouth to show 
[Walling] he didn't have any drugs in his mouth." R. 88:6, 17. Walling stated that this is 
a standard question he asks of people he perceives to be drug dealers. R. 88:18. Walling 
thought Mr. Alverez became nervous when asked this question. R. 88:18. Walling then 
"began to . . . observe [Mr. Alverez] attempting to move some objects . . . in his mouth 
and then . . . [Walling] could see some swallowing motion going on." R. 88:7, 30. 
Although Mr. Alverez's "mouth was closed," Walling "could see things . . .in the pit of 
Mr. Alverez's lip area" that looked "like his tongue and moving other objects in 
attempting to swallow at that time." R. 88:7, 19. Steed only noticed that Mr. Alverez 
"just appeared that he was attempting to swallow." R. 88:30. Walling and Steed 
immediately grabbed one of Mr. Alverez's arms and put him in a wrist lock, bending him 
forward telling him "to spit out what he had in his mouth." R. 88:7-8, 30-31. Mr. 
Alverez then spit out 15 balloons containing drugs. R. 88:7, 31. The time that passed 
between Walling asking to search Mr. Alverez's mouth until Mr. Alverez was forced to 
spit out the balloons was between five to 10 seconds. R. 88:8, 17. 
At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied the motion to 
suppress stating that under the totality of the circumstances the officers had a "reasonable 
basis to believe a crime was being committed in their presence" "if for no other reason" 
than "at the time that Mr. Alverez was asked if he would open his mouth, he doesn't 
open his mouth and starts to, in the officer's eyes, destroy evidence." R. 43; 88:38. On 
7 
October 17, 2003, Mr. Alverez filed a petition for interlocutory review of the trial court's 
denial of his motion to suppress. On November 26, 2003, this Court denied Mr. 
Alverez's petition for interlocutory review. R. 56. Mr. Alverez entered into a plea 
pursuant to Sery conditionally pleading guilty to one count of unlawful possession of a 
controlled/counterfeit substance with the intent to distribute allowing an appeal of the 
trial court's denial of his motion to suppress. R. 62-71. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred in denying Mr. Alverez's motion to suppress illegally 
obtained evidence when officers exceeded the scope of their initial level-two detention of 
Mr. Alverez without reasonable articulable suspicion in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment. A level-two encounter exists when in view of the totality of the 
circumstances a person would believe he is not free to leave. The officers conducted a 
level-two detention of Mr. Alverez based on their suspicion that the vehicle he was 
driving lacked insurance. However, the officers exceeded the scope of their initial 
detention when they began questioning Mr. Alverez regarding drugs without a 
reasonable suspicion of more serious criminal activity. The state failed to establish that 
the factors relied on by the officers supported a reasonable suspicion that Mr. Alverez 
was engaged in drug activity. Those factors consisted of a bottle of water, a facsimile of 
Jesus Malverde, two short stay visits, and a narcotic intelligence report identifying the 
vehicle driven by Mr. Alverez as possibly being involved in drug activity. The trial court 
8 
gave little weight to the bottle of water and facsimile and the state failed to establish its 
burden of proof regarding the veracity of the report or the significance of the two short 
stay \ IMIS . • IAIUA u» establish a reasonable suspicion that I" Ir 
Alverez was involved in drug activity permitting the officers to exceed the scope of their 
initial detention. Therefore, the officers' additional questions regarding drugs violated 
the Fourth Amendment. 
of drug activity allowing them to exceed the scope of their initial detention, the state 
failed to meet its burden justifying the officers' warrantless search of Mr. Alverez. The 
state failed u- K -hu ; i^ui-ie -_;^L mm HICK O.,I a . M indication thai drugs 
would be found in Mr. Alva ...-. ' >• * M-M.- »ki* f:iil '. :K- 11i-*t _ 
circumstances justified their warrantless search since it presented no evidence that if the 
balloons of drugs were swallowed they would not be susceptible to identification or 
Mr. Alverez was reasonable given the circumstances. Therefore, all the evidence seized 
as a result of the warrantless search should be suppressed. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING MR. ALVEREZ'S 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS ILLEGALLY OBTAINED EVIDENCE 
WHERE OFFICERS CONDUCTED A LEVEL-TWO DETENTION 
THEN EXCEEDED THE SCOPE OF THAT DETENTION WITHOUT 
REASONABLE ARTICULABLE SUSPICION. 
9 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides the following: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, 
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
U.S. Const, amend. IV. In Terry v. Ohio. 392 U.S. 1 (1968), the United States Supreme 
Court set forth an exception to the "probable cause" standard. "Under Terry [], and its 
progeny, there are three levels of police-citizen encounters, each requiring a different 
degree of justification under the Fourth Amendment." Salt Lake City v. Smoot, 921 P.2d 
1003, 1006 (Utah Ct. App. 1996); State v. Deitman. 739 P.2d 616, 617-18 (1987). "A 
level one citizen encounter with a law enforcement official is a consensual encounter 
wherein a citizen voluntarily responds to non-coercive questioning by an officer." State 
v. Hansen 2002 UT 125,^[34-36, 63 P.3d 650 (citations omitted). There is no seizure 
implicating the Fourth Amendment in a level-one encounter because "the person is free 
to leave at any point." Id. Under a level-two encounter "an officer may seize a person if 
the officer has an 'articulable suspicion5 that the person has committed or is about to 
commit a crime; however, the "detention must be temporary and last no longer than is 
necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop."' Deitman, 739 P.2d 616, 617 (Utah 
1987) (internal quotations and citations omitted); State v. Steward, 806 P.2d 213, 215 
(Utah Ct. App. 1991) (quoting State v. Swanigan. 699 P.2d 718, 719 (Utah 1985)); s_ee_ 
also United States v. Place. 462 U.S. 696, 706 (1983); State v. Kohl. 2000 UT 35, %l 1, 
10 
999 P.2d 7 ("a stop is jiistified only if there is a reasonable suspicion that a person is 
involved in criminal activity."); IJtah Code Ann. § 77-7-15 (2003) (officer must have 
reasonable suspicion to stop person in a public place and request name, address and 
explanation of action-- ' i KT n level -three detention, ' 'an sfficer ma) r arrest a si i spect if 
the officer has probable cause to believe an offense has been committed or is being 
committed." UL 1 ^ • • »H U vmendment is implicated under both a level-two and level-
suspicion to justify a level-two encounter. See State v. Delanev, 869 P.2d 4, 7 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1994). 
Once a level-two detention is made, "[t]he length and scope oi llic detention must 
permissible." State v. Johnson, 805 P.2d 761, 763 (Utah 1991) (quotations and citations 
omitted). In order to justify exceeding the scope of the initial detention the officers 
inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant [the additional] intrusion." Icl. at 764 
(quotations and citations omitted). 
There is no bright line test for what is, or is not, reasonable 
suspicion. Id Whether the officer had reasonable suspicion 
depends on the "totality of the circumstances." Id_ (citations 
omitted). The "totality of the circumstances" analysis must be 
based upon all the circumstances and must "raise a suspicion 
that the particular individual being stopped is engaged in 
wrongdoing." United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418, 
101 S Ct. 690, 695, 66 I .Ed.2d 621 (1981) (emphasis added). 
11 
Put differently, the officers must have a "particularized and 
objective basis for suspecting criminal activity by the 
particular person detained." State v. Sery. 758 P.2d 935, 941 
(Utah Ct. App. 1988) (citing Cortez, 449 U.S. at 417-18, 101 
S.Ct. at 694-95). 
Steward. 806 P.2d at 215-16; State v. Truiillo. 739 P.2d 85, 88 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
The "reasonable articulable suspicion" test requires the police officer "to point to 
'specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those 
facts, reasonably warrant [the additional] intrusion.'" Sery. 758 P.2d at 940 (quoting 
Terry. 392 U.S. at 21); State v. Lopez. 873 P.2d 1127, 1132 (Utah 1994) (reasonable 
suspicion must be based on specific, articulable facts from the total circumstances facing 
the officer at the time of the stop). "Anything less would invite intrusions upon 
constitutionally guaranteed rights based on nothing more substantial than inarticulate 
hunches . . . ." Sery, 758 P.2d at 941 (quoting Terry. 392 U.S. at 21-22). The officer's 
subjective belief regarding the matter is irrelevant. Lopez. 873 P.2d at 1136-37 (an 
officer's state of mind is irrelevant). "[T]he State bears the initial burden for establishing 
the articulable factual basis for the reasonable suspicion necessary to support an 
investigative stop." State v. Case. 884 P.2d 1274, 1276 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). If the 
officers expanded detention is not justified by an articulable suspicion that the individual 
has committed a crime, the Fourth Amendment is violated by the additional intrusion. Id 
Here, officers conducted a level-two detention of Mr. Alverez when questioning 
him regarding the lack of insurance on the vehicle he was driving. The officers then 
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exceeded the scope of that initial detention by questioning Mr. Alverez regarding drugs 
without the requisite reasonable articulable suspicion necessary in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment lerefcre, the trial court" s erred in denying Mr. Alverez's Motion to 
S u p p t v >. the c\ i d i \ H i - ! . <* •• O H H V I - N ill* \% ' \* \ f ^ - n. 
A. A Level-Two Seizure Occurs When Under The Totality of the 
Circumstances A Reasonable Person Would Believe He Is Not Free to 
Leave. 
[\,, , t u, .. -..
 : egarding 
vehicle's lack of insurance was a level-one encounter. R. 37. Contrary to the state's 
contention, officers conducted a level-two detention of Mr. Alverez. "The distinction 
between a level-one encounter (a purely consensual encounter) and a level-two encounter 
physical force or authority, a person believes his freedom of movement is restrained." 
State v.Struhs. 940 P.2d 1225, 1227 (IJtah Ct. App. 1997) (citing United States v. 
Mendenhall -t4o \ • , State v. Trujillo, * (I ) I; tl I Ct Vpp. • 
1987). A level-two "seizure under the fourth amendment occurs when a reasonable 
person, in view of all the circumstances, would believe he or she is not free to leave. 
This is true 'even if the purpose ofthe stop is limited and the resulting detention brief.'" 
Ra\. ). 
"Important to the determination [of whether the officers were engaged in a level-
two encounter] is whether [Mr. Alverez] remained, not in the spirit of cooperation with 
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the officer's investigation, but because he believed he [was] not free to leave." Struhs , 
940 P.2d at 1227 (quotations omitted). Factors tending to indicate a level-two seizure 
include: (1) the failure to inform the individual "he is free to leave, or that he does not 
have to answer additional questions," (2) "failure to issue a warning or citation before 
engaging in additional questioning," (3) "a coercive show of authority, such as the 
presence of more than one officer, the display of a weapon, physical touching by the 
officer, or his use of a commanding tone of voice indicating that compliance might be 
compelled," [Hansen. 2002 UT 125 at 1J41; State v. Patefield. 927 P.2d 655, 659 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1996)]; (4) "an officer blocking] a defendant's vehicle," (5) an "officer's 
stealthy approach" [Struhs, 940 P.2d at 1227-28]; and (6) accusatory or investigatory 
questions that indicate the individual is suspected of being "engaged in some sort of 
illegal activity." State v. Hansen, 2000 UT App 353, ^ [14, 17 P.3d 1135 reversed in part 
on other grounds Hansen, 2002 UT 125. 
Many of these factors were present during Mr. Alverez's encounter with Walling 
and Steed. For example, the officers used a "stealthy approach" in confronting Mr. 
Alverez. While waiting for Mr. Alverez to return to the vehicle, Walling and Steed stood 
behind a full-sized van parked next to the vehicle. R. 88:5-6. Walling and Steed then 
stepped out of their hiding place and "came around the van" intercepting Mr. Alverez's 
path as he attempted to approach the vehicle. R. 88:5-6, 15, 21. Standing next to the 
vehicle, Mr. Alverez was then subjected to a coercive show of authority as Walling and 
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Steed both confronted him wearing their full uniforms. R. 88:2. Walling and Steed then 
subjected Mr. Alverez to accusatory questions that indicated he was suspected of being 
engaged iiini ill legal auilli >, iiiill I K , X X . < > , I v i d A1 ailing initially asked whethe, :w;. .\iverez 
"knew the vehicle that he was dro n.. linsured." nn! Si.*i-<l 
never indicated that Mr. Alverez was going to be cited for not having insurance, never 
asked Mr. Alverez his name or for his identification or even if the vehicle belonged to 
hi in see 1 lansen. * 
addressed one of the reasons for the initial stop, a reasonable person would not have felt 
free to terminate the encounter."). Rather, after Mr. Alverez inquired how Walling knew 
that the vehicle was uninsured. \\ ailing immediately tola A „ . u \ e r e z that the "vehicle 
that he \\ as dri\ in?* had been si lspoctod nfhi'in« •• i ' J ;•. .. •. -• 
activities." R. 88:6, 16. Walling then proceeded to ask Mr. Alverez "if he had any drugs 
on his person." R. 88:6, 16. When Mr. Alverez responded "No," Walling asked if he 
coi ild seai: ch his i i I : i it!: l R 88:6 16 1 / 
These were not simply questions posed to Mr. Alverez which he was free to 
disregard and walk away. See State v. Jackson, 805 P.2d 765, 767 (Utah Ct. App. 
h*xm jeeu. gi\ch .... , ;.;i;^ ,.. ^.rcumstances, UIL oinccis conduct would have 
officers['] requests or otherwise terminate the encounter and go about his . . . business." 
Hansen, 2000 UT App at f 12 (quotations and citations omitted). Therefore, Mr. Alverez 
was seized for purposes implicating the Fourth Amendment the moment the officers 
detained him with questions regarding the vehicle's insurance. 
B. Additional Questions Further Detaining Mr. Alverez Must Have Been 
Supported By Reasonable Suspicion of More Serious Criminal Activity. 
The state argued in its opposition to Mr. Alverez's motion to suppress that ,f[t]he 
additional detainment of [Mr. Alverez] was supported by reasonable suspicion that [Mr. 
Alverez] was participating in drug activity based on the narcotic intelligence report, the 
items observed in the car, and [Mr. Alverez]'s attempt to swallow while being 
questioned." R. 37-38. However, an officer may expand the length and/or scope of the 
level-two detention only if the officer obtains additional information, "independent" of 
the original justification for the stop, to support further detention. See Chapman, 921 
P.2d at 453. Here, the state relies on information to justify the further detention that the 
officers knew before detaining Mr. Alverez and realized was not enough to create a 
reasonable suspicion of drug activity allowing them to initiate a level-two detention. 
Furthermore, the officers did not observe any conduct by Mr. Alverez that would suggest 
that he was engaging in any type of drug activity. Therefore, questions pertaining to 
drug activity exceed the scope of the stop in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 
In determining whether a "seizure is constitutionally reasonable, [this Court] must 
first determine whether the officers['] action[s were] justified at [their] inception." State 
v. Chapman, 921 P.2d 446, 450 (Utah 1996) (quotations and citations omitted). "If so, 
[this Court] then considers] whether the resulting detention was reasonably related in 
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scope to the circumstances that justified the interference in the first place." 1 d 
(quotations and citations omitted). Mr. Alverez does not dispute that reasonable 
suspK i.-n CMMVU .... ,. . .....i.r ai.^ ; n^. „ ,J engage him ,n a ic\ci-iwo .stop 
regarding the vehicle's l:u:k i-.I'insurance. Howv\tr ,f
 >; M J, I. I.-NII.^I 
'must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the 
stop.'" Id. at 452 (quotations and citations omitted). 
be limited to those types of questions that would assist the officers in ascertaining 
information regarding the vehicle's insurance status. Instead, Waiting's questioning 
regarding the vehicle's insurance was limited to one accusatory statement. Walling never 
a s k e t ' ' 4Jiv i'-' ' • : i •- ' iM>nrdin< *\ ;, K .. - < , . M
 v-
identification, or whether he in fact owned the vehicle. Nor did Walling indicate how the 
vehicle's lack of insurance was going to be handled. Rather, Walling immediately told 
involved in some drug dealing activities." R. 88:6, iu. Walling then proceeded to ask 
Mr. Alverez "if he had any drugs on his person" and "if he minded opening up his mouth 
u, hiiow . -- ....ung] he didn't have any drugs it 11: lis iiioiitl i." R 88:6, 16 1 7. 
QlIC^I i n n , ni*i • . •- ' i v / s n s n i >. :. *'. i iy 
exceeded the scope justifying the initial stop. "Investigative questioning that further 
detains [an individual] must be supported by reasonable suspicion of more serious 
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criminal activity." Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1132. The officers "must be able to articulate a 
particularized and objective basis for their suspicions that is drawn from the totality of 
circumstances facing them at the time of the seizure." State v. Robinson, 797 P.2d 
431,436 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). More specifically, the officers must have a 
"particularized and objective basis for suspecting criminal activity by the particular 
person detained." Sery, 758 P.2d at 941 (emphasis added) (citing Cortez., 449 U.S. at 
417-18, 101 S.Ct. at 694-95). 
Nothing in Mr. Alverez's conduct or response regarding the vehicle's insurance 
gave rise to a reasonable suspicion of more serious criminal activity. The information the 
officers possessed was insufficient to establish a reasonable suspicion that Mr. Alverez 
was or had engaged in criminal activity. This information consisted of the following: the 
vehicle Mr. Alverez was driving was listed on a "narcotics intelligence report" as 
"possibly" dealing drugs, two short stay visits to the complex, a bottle of water and 
facsimile of Jesus Malverde observed inside the vehicle. "None of these factors, either 
singly or in the aggregate, necessarily indicate wrongdoing as opposed to innocent 
actions by [Mr. Alverez]." State v. Svkes. 840 P.2d 825, 828 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). In 
fact, these factors did not create a "particularized and objective basis for suspecting" that 
Mr. Alverez was engaged in criminal activity. Steward, 806 P.2d at 216 (quotations and 
citations omitted). 
The trial court's examination of the totality of these circumstances further 
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illustrates how these factors did not indicate that Mr. Alverez was engaged in criminal 
activity. The trial court stated "[t]here are no premises that are identified in this matter, 
there are no - the vehicle was under suspicion, .-u. -^* L k..- - now that was other than 
we don't know about. I give little weight - weight but very little weight to the water 
bottle and to the [Jesus Malverde] image in the cat " R 88:38. The trial court then 
\*CL . -uiicuu : . . ei:> iiau a
 r e a s o n a |3 i e suspicioi i to belie\ e a 
"crime was being committed in their presence" "if for no other reason" than when "KIt 
Alverez was asked if he would open his mouth, he doesn't open his mouth and starts to, 
in the officer's eyes, destroy evidence." R. 88:38. See Point II. The trial court's 
reasoning mmerscores the state's faili ire in: i e stablisl lii lg its initial bi lrden that till: lese 
factors supported a reasonable suspicion that Mr. Alverez was engaged in drug activity. 
The trial court correctly gave "very little" credence to the bottle of water and Jesus 
Malverde facsimile in making its determinatioi c oni\ other two factors the officers 
the two short stay visits. However, it is apparent from the record that the trial court also 
did not give these two factors much weight either stating, "the vehicle was under 
officer testified there are some other involvement that we don't know about." R. 88:38. 
Moreover, these factors hold little, if any, weight because the state failed to establish its 
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burden of proof regarding the veracity of this narcotics intelligence report or the 
significance of Mr. Alverez's two short stay visits to the complex. Therefore, taken 
together these insignificant factors failed to give rise to a reasonable suspicion that Mr. 
Alverez was engaged in criminal activity allowing the officers to exceed the scope of 
their initial detention. 
1. The State Failed to Establish Its Burden Of Proof Regarding the Veracity of 
The Narcotics Intelligence Report. 
The state failed in its burden to present any evidence regarding the reliability of 
the "narcotics intelligence report" used to identify the vehicle Mr. Alverez was driving as 
being involved in drug activity. The only evidence offered about this report was that 
Walling was observing the condominium complex on 2450 Elizabeth Street "looking to 
see [if] a vehicle was going to return that [he] had [seen] on the previous day. This 
vehicle [was] one that [he] had received information from [his] narcotics department that 
was possibly dealing drugs." R. 88:3. The department "had somebody who called in and 
reported drug sales near her place" which was "2nd South and Douglas Street where the 
vehicle was observed." R. 88:9-10. While an investigating officer receiving an 
informant report "may take it at face value and act on it forthwith," [Kaysville City v. 
Mulcahv, 943 P.2d 231, 234 (Utah Ct. App. 1997)] if the investigating officer's conduct 
is later challenged in a motion to suppress, the state will be required to show - after the 
fact - that the informant's report had sufficient information to support the conduct and 
the investigating officer sufficiently corroborated the report to sustain a finding of 
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reasonable suspicion. See Case, 884 P.2d at 1277. 
This Court has explained the doctrine concerning reliance on an informant's tip 
in Mulcahy. Mulcahy, 943 I \2d at 233; see also State v. Valenzuela, zuw; \pp Jj>2, 
Tfl5 " "* iV ' "s •» * • • identified thnv fart * oi Vr in -\s<c^\r^ whether 
information, including an informant's report, is sufficiently reliable. IcL_ at 235-36. 
[This Court's] first focus is upon "the type of tip or informant involved," 
granting identified informants substantially more credibility than 
anonymous informants. Next, [the Court] examine[s] "whether the 
informants gave enough detail about the observed criminal activity to 
support a [seizure]," and concluded that "[a] tip is more reliable if it is 
apparent that the informant observed the details personally, instead of 
relaying information from a third party." Finally, [this Court] examine[s] 
"whether the police officer's personal observation confirm the dispatcher's 
report of the informant's tip," noting that an officer can corroborate the 
information "'either by observing the illegal activity[,] or by finding the 
person, [and the other material facts] substantially as described by the 
informant.'" Moreover, while we stated that "'where the reliability of the 
information is increased, less corroboration is necessary,'" we also 
established that absent a risk to public safety we expect police officers to 
make significant independent corroborative efforts to confirm the 
information. 
Valenzuela, 2001 I ) I \ pp 332 at %l 5 (ei i lpl lasis added) (citatioi is oi i litted) 
In Mulcahy, the tip of a "drunk driver who was at the time on the road," came 
from an "identified citizen-informer." Mulcahy, 943 P.2d at 236-37. The informant gave 
h i > n a n • u .: i ^ u i - • *s* i n ; • • ' IM. :\>) . . ' . n ' 
exposing himself to prosecution if the report turned out to be false. This Court 
considered the informant in that case to be "high on the reliability scale." Id. "[W]e 
simply presume his report to the dispatcher was reliable and truthful," thereby supporting 
reasonable-articulable-suspicion in that case to justify the officer's traffic stop. IcL_ 
In Alverez's case, the state failed to offer any evidence regarding this report, 
therefore, the type of information this report was based on is unknown. While the record 
indicates that "somebody" called in to report drug dealing in their neighborhood, there is 
no way to know whether the person reporting this tip is a "named citizen informant" 
where the veracity of the information is assumed to be more reliable or an anonymous 
caller where the basis of the tipsters "knowledge and veracity are typically unknown." 
Mulcahv, 943 P.2d 235 (citation omitted); see also City of St. George v. Carter. 945 P.2d 
165, 169 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) ("A tip from a citizen informant who gives his or her 
name is highly reliable because the police may verify the information and it subjects the 
informant to penalty if the information is false."). At most, the record supports that this 
report was based on an anonymous citizen tip concerning drug dealings in this person's 
neighborhood twenty blocks away on 2 nd South and Douglas Street. See R. 88:9-10 (Mr. 
Alverez was seized at a complex located on 2450 Elizabeth Street). Anonymous tips 
such as this "are toward 'the low-end of the reliability scale.'" IcL (citation omitted); see 
also Florida v.J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 120 S.Ct. 1375, 1378 (2000) ("anonymous tips . . . are 
generally less reliable than tips from known informants."). Since the record in this case 
is silent with respect to the type of information the report relied on and the type of person 
who called with the report, under the first factor, the information provided to the officers 
was on the low end of the reliability scale, weighing against a determination that 
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reasonable suspicion existed to exceed the scope of the initial detention. 
Next, the state failed to present any evidence regarding the details of the 
informant's observations of "criminal activity to support a [seizure]." The only 
information regarding the informant's observations is that "somebody . . . called in and 
reported drug sales near her place" which was "2nd South and Douglas Street where the 
vehicle was observed." R. 88:9-10. Due to the state's failure to present any evidence 
regarding the information this report relied on, there is no indication as to whether the 
informant made any personal observations or had first-hand information concerning the 
alleged drug sales. In sum, there is no indication as to whether the informant based her 
report on a mere hunch, a casual rumor or an unconfirmed report from an unidentified 
third party. While Walling and Steed may have been entitled to take the information at 
face value, Mulcahv, 943 P.2d at 234, the state failed to establish "after the fact" the 
details of the information that spurred the dispatch. In this case, the information linking 
the vehicle to alleged drug sales provided no specific indicia of reliability. See JJL,, 120 
S.Ct. at 1378. Under the second factor, the state failed to present any evidence regarding 
the details of the information this report relied upon to support a reasonable suspicion to 
exceed the scope of the initial detention. 
Finally, the state failed to present evidence that the officers made "significant 
independent corroborative efforts to confirm the information." The record indicates that 
the officers were "watching this area because [they] had heard there [were drug] dealings 
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in this area." R. 88:3. The officers did not have any specific information that drugs were 
being sold from anywhere in this particular complex, rather they had just been told about 
drug activity in "the Elizabeth Street area of that south." R. 88:9. In fact, the officers 
focused on this particular complex because they were "just [taking] a chance that day to 
see if anything was going to come in and out of there." R. 88:9. While watching the 
complex on July 23 rd, Walling recognized the vehicle driven by Mr. Alverez as one listed 
on the narcotics report. R. 88:3-4. Walling observed Mr. Alverez enter the complex and 
return to the vehicle in less than five minutes. R. 88:4. The following day, Walling and 
Steed observed the vehicle again return to the complex. R. 88:4. 
Although, Walling testified he believed that a drug transaction had occurred at 
some unit in the complex, no attempt was made to verify his hunch. R. 88:13. In fact, 
both Walling and Steed testified that they could not see where in the complex Mr. 
Alverez walked into or which of the many units he had gone to nor did they make any 
attempt to find out. R. 88:13-15, 31-32. Rather than investigate, the officers "chose to 
deal with [Mr. Alverez]" directly. R. 88:14. In directly dealing with Mr. Alverez, the 
officers did not notice anything unusual about his behavior or speech that raised their 
suspicion that he was engaged in criminal activity. Walling testified that he did not have 
any difficulty understanding Mr. Alverez or notice any unusual bulges in his mouth. R. 
88:16-17. In fact, Walling thought Mr. Alverez "talked quite well." R. 88:19. 
In addition to the two short stay visits, the only other corroboration the officers 
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did of the report was to look through the window of the vehicle and observed a "small 
bottle of water" in the vehicle's console which Steed has "seen [individuals suspected of 
having narcotics] use . . . to swallow drugs that they contain in their mouths" and a 
facsimile of Jesus Malverde whom he has seen in drug houses and "[according to the 
people that [Steed has] talked to [Malverde is] the patron saint of drug dealing. R. 
88:21-22, 29. However, when pressed Steed was unable to distinguish Malverde from 
other male Catholic icons other than Jesus Christ. R. 88:28. As noted above, these 
factors were insignificant and were expressly given very little weight by the trial court. 
Moreover, in directly dealing with Mr. Alverez the officers did not ask him any 
questions within the scope of the initial detention that would have helped determine 
whether his answers raised their suspicion of criminal activity. The officers did not take 
any action to determine whether Mr. Alverez was the actual individual connected with 
the vehicle suspected of drug activity. For example, the officers could have asked Mr. 
Alverez if he in fact owned the vehicle under suspicion. The officers also could have 
asked for his name or requested identification which would have assisted in determining 
whether Mr. Alverez was the individual registered as the owner of the vehicle. 
Requesting identification would have also allowed the officers to determine whether Mr. 
Alverez actually resided in the complex or allowed them to ask him regarding his 
purpose in visiting. However, nothing was done to corroborate or confirm the veracity of 
this report. The state failed to establish the reliability of the information reported and 
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failed to show that the officers corroborated the report. Hence, the report was 
insufficient to support a reasonable suspicion that Mr. Alverez was engaged in criminal 
activity. 
2. The Officers Failed To Show the Significance of the Two Short Stay Visits. 
The officers' observation of Mr. Alverez's two short stay visits to the complex 
even when viewed along with the other factors was not indicative of criminal activity. 
This is especially true in light of the fact that the officers did not take any steps to gather 
information that would corroborate their hunch regarding Mr. Alverez's presence at the 
complex. The officers' subjective belief regarding the observation cannot support a 
reasonable suspicion. See Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1136-37 (an officer's state of mind is 
irrelevant); Patefield, 927 P.2d at 659. 
While taking "a chance" that they might observe drug activity at this complex, the 
officers noticed a vehicle pull in that was listed on a narcotics intelligence report. R. 
88:3, 9. The officers did not have any specific information that drug dealings were 
actually occurring at this particular complex. R. 88:9. The officers observed Mr. 
Alverez get out of the vehicle, go somewhere in the complex, and return to the vehicle 
and leave. R. 88:4. Walling had a hunch that a drug deal had occurred so he came back 
to the complex the next day to watch for this vehicle. R. 88:4, 10. The next day, the 
officers saw this same vehicle pull into the complex and Mr. Alverez get out and go 
somewhere into the complex. R. 88:4, 21. The officers did not observe on either day 
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where in the complex Mr. Alverez was going, nor did they attempt to ascertain this 
information. R. 88:13-15,31-3 2. The officers did not observe Mr. Alverez engaged in 
any unlawful activity nor did they talk to anyone in the complex about why Mr. Alverez 
was there. When the officers intercepted Mr. Alverez on the way to the vehicle, the 
officers did not ask him any questions that would have been permissible within the scope 
of their initial detention that might have corroborated their hunch regarding his activity. 
The officers did not ask Mr. Alverez his name or request his identification which may 
have assisted in determining whether the reason he was at this complex was because he 
lived there. Nor did the officers ever attempt to make any inquiry into Mr. Alverez's 
visits to the complex. " Any connection between [Mr. Alverez] and illegal activity was 
purely speculation." Sykes, 840 P.2d at 828. Therefore, Mr. Alverez's two short stay 
visits have little if any weight in the totality of the circumstances analysis of whether 
reasonable suspicion existed to extend the scope of the initial detention. 
In Sykes, an officer was conducting surveillance on a house suspected of drug 
activity. During the surveillance, "defendant drove up, parked, and entered the house. 
Approximately three minutes later, defendant returned to her car and drove off." kL_ at 
826. In addition to defendant's short stay visit, the only other factors articulated for the 
officer's suspicion were that "(1) the neighbors had complained about individuals 
entering and leaving the house at all hours; (2) [The officer] previously had purchased 
cocaine in the general area; (3) there was unspecified information from a confidential 
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informant; (4) there was an ongoing investigation of the house; and (5) defendant drove 
up to the house, entered it and left shortly thereafter.11 Id. at 828. 
The officer followed the car, initiated a stop, and conducted a computer check 
where he discovered several warrants outstanding for the defendant's arrest. The officer 
questioned defendant about narcotics trafficking at the home but "[defendant denied 
having any knowledge11 about drug activity. Id. at 826. Sykes was arrested on the 
outstanding warrants, and the officer searched her car, discovering cocaine. Id_ The trial 
court denied defendant's motion to suppress the evidence. Id_ Reversing the trial court's 
decision, this Court concluded that none of the factors relied on by the officer 
"necessarily indicate wrongdoing as opposed to innocent actions by defendant." Id. at 
828. 
At the time of the arrest, any connection between defendant and illegal 
activity was purely speculation. The police did not know the identity of 
either the owner or occupants of the house, and they did not know 
defendant. At that point, they had no positive evidence linking the house to 
illegal activity. . . Defendant's single visit does not link her to any drug 
dealers. She could have as easily been at the house to visit someone who 
was not there, and so left quickly. 
LI at 828-29. 
Similarly, the officers belief regarding Mr. Alverez's connection to illegal activity 
was purely speculative. IcL The officers did not know Mr. Alverez's identity or have any 
"positive evidence" linking him to the vehicle suspected of being involved in drug 
activity. Neither the complex itself nor a specific unit had been identified as being linked 
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to illegal drug dealing activities. While the officers observed Mr. Alverez make two 
short stay visits to the complex, they had no evidence that he didn't reside there or 
observe anything that would indicate that he was engaged in any type of illegal conduct. 
The totality of the circumstances in this case fails to establish a reasonable 
articulable suspicion that Mr. Alverez was involved in drug activity permitting the 
officers to exceed the scope of their initial detention. The officers did not observe 
anything unusual about Mr. Alverez's behavior or speech when questioning him about 
the vehicle's lack of insurance, they did not observe any contact consistent with a drug 
buy, or observe anything to suggest that he was engaging in any type of drug activity. 
The ambiguous observations made by officers previous to detaining him coupled with 
their failure to corroborate the report fails to provide the reasonable suspicion necessary 
to allow the officers to question Mr. Alverez concerning drugs. The officers had no 
more than a "inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch" that Mr. Alverez was 
dealing drugs, and failed to take any action that might have confirmed or dispelled their 
hunch. Johnson, 805 P.2d at 764 (quotations and citations omitted). Therefore, the 
officers' questions regarding drugs exceeded the permissible scope of the initial 
detention in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 
POINT II. EVEN IF THIS COURT DETERMINES REASONABLE 
SUSPICION EXISTED PERMITTING THE OFFICERS TO EXCEED 
THE SCOPE OF THE INITIAL DETENTION. THE STATE DID NOT 
MEET ITS BURDEN TO JUSTIFY THE OFFICERS' WARRANTLESS 
SEARCH OF MR. ALVEREZ. 
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Even if this Court determines that reasonable suspicion existed for the officers to 
question Mr. Alverez about suspected drug activities, the evidence seized by the officers 
should be excluded because Mr. Alverez's Fourth Amendment rights were violated when 
the officers forcibly conducted a warrantless search of his person without the necessary 
showing of exigent circumstances. Unless a governmental agency has secured a valid 
warrant to conduct a search, searches "are/?er se unreasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment- subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated 
exceptions.11 State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255, 1258 (Utah 1987) (quoting Katz v. United 
States. 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). The "well-delineated" exception at issue here required 
the state to establish that "exigent circumstances" existed justifying a forcible bodily 
search. Citv of Orem v. Henrie. 868 P.2d 1384, 1388 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); Schmerber 
v. California. 384 U.S. 757, 768-72, 86 S. Ct. 1826, 1834-36 (1966). In finding 
exceptions to the warrant requirement, '[t]he State bears [a] particularly heavy burden" of 
persuasion. State v. Beavers. 859 P.2d 9, 13 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
In order to meet this burden in the case of a bodily search, the State must 
establish three elements: (1) a clear indication that evidence would be 
found; (2) exigent circumstances that justified the warrantless bodily 
intrusion; and (3) that the method chosen was a reasonable one, performed 
in a reasonable manner. 
State v. Hodson. 866 P.2d 556, 560 (Utah Ct. App. 1993), reversed on other grounds . 
907 P.2d 1155 (Utah 1995) (citing Schmerber. 384 U.S. at 768-72). A review of the 
three prongs of the Schmerber test shows that the State failed to meet it burden to justify 
30 
the warrantless bodily search of Mr. Alverez. Therefore, the trial court erred in denying 
Mr. Aiverez's motion to suppress. 
A. There Was No "Clear Indication" That Evidence Would Be Found. 
Given that warrantless searches and seizures must be justified by probable cause, 
and that the expectation of privacy one has in one's body is the highest recognized under 
the Constitution, the Schmerber prerequisite to a search that there is a "clear indication" 
that evidence would be found must be established by probable cause. See Hodson, 866 
P.2d at 560 ("'Clear indication5 requires that there be probable cause to believe that 
evidence will be found." (citation omitted)). "In dealing with probable cause,. . . as the 
very name implies, we deal with probabilities." State v. Menke, 787 P.2d 537, 542 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1990) (quoting Brinegar v. United States. 338 U.S. 160, 175, 69 S. Ct. 1302 
(1949)). Probable cause is "more than bare suspicion." IcL The "'determination^ of 
whether probable cause exists require[s] a common sense assessment of the totality of the 
circumstances confronting the arresting or searching officer.'" Patefield, 927 P.2d at 660 
(citation omitted). In this case, the officers did not even have a reasonable articulable 
suspicion to believe Mr. Alverez was involved in drug activities, see Point I, let alone 
probable cause to believe that he was swallowing drugs in his mouth. 
Once the officers detained Mr. Alverez, Walling first asked "him if he knew the 
vehicle that he was driving was uninsured." R. 88:6, 15. Mr. Alverez responded, 
"How'd you know that?" R. 88:9. Walling then stated to Mr. Alverez that the "vehicle 
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that he was driving had been suspected of being a vehicle involved in some drug 
activities." R. 88:6, 16. Mr. Alverez responded that "he knew nothing of that." R. 88:6. 
Walling then proceeded to ask Mr. Alverez "if he had any drugs on his person." R. 88:6, 
16. Mr. Alverez said "No." R. 88:6, 17. Walling "then asked [Mr. Alverez] if he 
minded opening up his mouth to show [Walling] he didn't have any drugs in his mouth." 
R. 88:6, 17. Walling did not notice any unsightly or unusual bulges in Mr. Alverez's 
mouth nor did he notice anything he would consider unusual except that Mr. Alverez 
became nervous when asked this question. R. 88:16, 18. In fact, Walling thought Mr. 
Alverez "talked quite well." R. 88:16-17, 19. Instead of being based on any reasonable 
articulate suspicion, Walling testified it is a standard question he asks of people he 
perceives to be drug dealers. R. 88:18. Walling then observed what he described as Mr. 
Alverez "attempting to move some objects . . . in his mouth" and "some swallowing 
motion." R. 88:7, 30. Although Mr. Alverez's "mouth was closed," Walling believed he 
"could see things . . . in the pit of Mr. Alverez's lip area" that looked "like his tongue and 
moving other objects in attempting to swallow at that time." R. 88:7, 19. Steed, 
however, only noticed that Mr. Alverez "just appeared that he was attempting to 
swallow" after Walling asked if he could search Mr. Alverez's mouth for drugs. R. 
88:30. Walling and Steed immediately grabbed one of Mr. Alverez's arms and put him 
in a wrist lock, bending him forward telling him "to spit out what he had in his mouth." 
R. 88:7-8, 30-31. The time that passed between Walling asking to search Mr. Alverez's 
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mouth for drugs until Mr. Alverez was forcibly grabbed was between five to 10 seconds. 
R. 88:8, 17. 
Under the totality of the circumstances the officers did not have a "clear 
indication" that drugs would be found in Mr. Alverez's mouth. At the time of the 
requested search, the officers did not know if they would in fact find anything in Mr. 
Alverez's mouth. The officers did not observe Mr. Alverez put any thing in his mouth 
nor did they observe any conduct by Mr. Alverez that would suggest that his attempt to 
swallow was indicative of swallowing drugs. Compare Hodson, 866 P.2d at 560 
("Defendant's furtive gestures of putting something in his mouth . . ., coupled with the 
agents' specific knowledge that [an informant] intended to purchase illegal drugs from 
defendant provided a clear indication that evidence would be found in defendant's 
mouth."). In fact, Walling asked to search Mr. Alverez's mouth not because he saw 
something in there or had a hard time understanding Mr. Alverez but because that is a 
standard question he asks of those he perceives to be drug dealers. When the officers 
acted with force in an effort to have Mr. Alverez "spit out" whatever was in his mouth, 
the officers were acting on no more than a "bare suspicion" or hunch that Mr. Alverez 
had drugs in his mouth. The only information the officers possessed at this time was 
based on an uncorroborated report that Mr. Alverez was driving a vehicle that was 
suspected of "possibly" drug dealing in an area more than 20 blocks away. In the vehicle 
there was a small bottle of water and a facsimile of Jesus Malverde. The vehicle may or 
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may not be Mr. Alverez's. Finally, Mr. Alverez made two short stay visits to a complex 
in which he may or may not be living. This information, even when coupled with the 
ambiguous "swallowing" conduct, did not amount to probable cause justifying a forcible 
search. Therefore, there can be no justification for the search under exigent 
circumstances. 
Because the state did not meet its burden to show that there was a clear indication 
that evidence of drugs would be found in Mr. Alverez's mouth, this Court need not 
address the other two prerequisites outlined in Schmerber. See State v. Palmer, 803 P.2d 
1249, 1252 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). However, even if this Court were to determine that 
probable cause existed, the exigent circumstances argument still fails because the state 
did not bear its burden of showing that the evidence would likely have been destroyed 
had the officers not seized it immediately. Discussion of the other two inter-related 
prongs further demonstrates how the trial court erred in denying Mr. Alverez's motion to 
suppress. 
B. There Were No Exigent Circumstances. 
Under the exigent circumstances prong of the Schmerber test, the supreme court 
has stated "that 'the police must. . . believe that. . . either contraband or evidence of a 
crime . . . may be lost if not immediately seized.'" Hodson, 866 P.2d at 561 (quoting 
State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460, 470 (Utah 1990)). The Schmerber requirement of 
exigent circumstances is a serious one, which is based on the constitutional right to 
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bodily integrity. 
Search warrants are ordinarily required for searches of dwellings, and, 
absent an emergency, no less could be required where intrusions into the 
human body are concerned. The requirement that a warrant be obtained is 
a requirement that the inferences to support the search "be drawn by a 
neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer 
engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime." The 
importance of informed, detached and deliberate determinations of the 
issue whether or not to invade another's body in search of evidence of guilt 
is indisputable and great. 
Schmerben 384 U.S. at 770 (citations omitted). 
The state argued in its opposition to the motion to suppress that exigent 
circumstances existed because "[a] reasonable officer would know that it is a common 
practice among drug dealers to swallow the evidence if the police arrive on the scene. 
Though the officers did not know exactly what was in [Mr. Alverez's] mouth, their 
suspicion that it may have been an unlawful item was reasonable under the 
circumstances." R. 39. Continuing, the state argued that the officers' suspicion was 
reasonable because Mr. Alverez "was traveling in a known drug dealer car and he 
refused to open his mouth despite repeated requests to do so." R. 39. In denying Mr. 
Alverez's motion to suppress, the trial court erroneously concluded that "if for no other 
reason" "at the time that Mr. Alverez was asked if he would open his mouth, he doesn't 
open his mouth and starts to, in the officer's eyes, destroy evidence" "at that point,. . . 
[the officers] had [a] reasonable basis to believe a crime was being committed in their 
presence. R. 38. 
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Both the state's argument and the trial court's reasoning are flawed. Contrary to 
the state's assertion, Mr. Alverez was not "traveling in a known drug dealer car" but in a 
vehicle that was listed on a narcotics intelligence report as one "possibly" dealing drugs. 
This report was based on no more than an unsubstantiated anonymous tip. See Point I. 
Next, the refusal to consent to a bodily search cannot create reasonable suspicion and 
similarly does not give rise to exigent circumstances. See United States v. Manuel, 992 
F.2d 272, 274 (10th Cir. 1993) ("The exercise of a right to refuse consent alone cannot 
be the basis of reasonable suspicion." citing Florida v. Rover, 460 U.S. 491, 498, 75 L. 
Ed. 2d 229, 103 S. Ct. 1319 (1983)). Finally, the standard of proof for the exigent 
circumstances prong of the Schmerber test is at least probable cause, not whether the 
officers had a reasonable suspicion that Mr. Alverez had drugs in his mouth. See Palmer, 
803 P.2d at 1252 (stating "'the police must have probable cause and believe that either 
contraband or evidence of a crime . . . may be lost if not immediately seized.'" (citation 
omitted)). Reasonable suspicion will only permit limited searches of individuals who are 
believed to be armed and dangerous which was not put at issue here. See State v. 
Despain, 2003 UT App 266, ^|8, 74 P.3d 1176 (during an investigative stop officers need 
only "reasonably believe[] that the individual may be armed and dangerous" to conduct 
"a 'frisk' or 'pat-down' search of the individual). Therefore, the trial court erroneously 
applied the reasonable suspicion standard in concluding the officers had a reasonable 
basis to forcibly search Mr. Alverez's mouth. 
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The state further argued that exigent circumstances existed because evidence 
would have been lost or destroyed. R. 39. In order to "establish exigent circumstances 
justifying a warrantless search" the state must show "'either that the procurement of a 
warrant would have jeopardized the safety of the police officers or the public, or that the 
evidence was likely to have been lost or destroyed." Hodson, 866 P.2d at 561 (quoting 
Palmer, 803 P.2d at 1252). The state contends that because the officers "did not know 
how the drugs were packaged, exigent circumstances justified a warrantless search." R. 
39. However, the evidence the state presented at the motion to suppress hearing belies its 
argument. R. 88:2-3,21. 
At the motion to suppress hearing, the state presented evidence from the officers 
regarding their training and experience on how drugs are packaged when they are carried 
in the mouth. R. 88:2-3, 21. The state presented the following testimony from the 
officers: 
State: Are you familiar with how drug - how drugs such as cocaine and heroin 
are usually packaged? 
Walling: Yes, I am. 
State: And how is that? 
Walling: Many times they're packaged in a - they'll take like a plastic, piece 
of plastic, put the drugs inside that, twist that into a small - small 
ball, you know, probably the size of the end of my fingertip, and 
then they encompass that with a balloon and tie that off. 
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State: And where are they usually carried that you've seen? 
Walling: Typically when they package them in this fashion they'll carry them 
in their mouth. 
State: Have you done drug arrests before? 
Steed: Yes. 
State: How many would you say? 
Steed: I'd say I've personally been involved in more than 20 arrests at least. 




Steed also testified that in regard to the bottle of water in the vehicle that ff[i]n the 
past when [he] had been involved in an initiation of, say traffic stops that contain person 
that [he] believed to have narcotics [he has] seen them use that water to swallow drugs 
that they contain in their mouths." R. 88:29. When Steed observed Mr. Alverez 
"attempting to swallow" "it was [his] belief that he probably had balloons in his mouth." 
R. 88:30. The state did not present any evidence that drugs are carried using a different 
method. In fact, the state's evidence demonstrates that the officers believed that if Mr. 
Alverez was carrying drugs in his mouth the drugs would be packaged in this manner. 
In Hodson, 866 P.2d at 561, the defendant argued that exigent circumstances did 
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not exist because "the police had no knowledge concerning how the heroin was wrapped 
or whether it would travel safely through his system." Id. This Court determined that it 
is precisely this reason in which exigent circumstances justify a warrantless search and 
seizure. Id However, in reversing this Court's decision regarding the reasonableness of 
the search, the supreme court noted that "drugs ingested [by swallowing] can only follow 
two paths: Either they will pass through the system intact because of their packaging, or 
they will be absorbed into the bloodstream of the swallower. In either event, they are 
susceptible to identification and recovery in supervised, nonviolent post-arrest setting." 
Hodson,907P.2datll58. 
Similarly, in Palmer, this Court cited People v. Bracamonte, 540 P.2d 624, 631 
(Cal. 1975), for the proposition that there was "no justifiable reason to believe [that the 
evidence] would be destroyed by defendant if he had swallowed it." Palmer. 803 P.2d at 
1253. In Bracamonte, narcotics agents had secured a warrant to search defendant's 
residence, vehicles and person. 540 P.2d at 626. While attempting to execute the 
warrant, the defendant attempted to flee in her vehicle. IdL. An agent then observed the 
defendant place two balloons in her mouth and swallow them. Id_ The agent watched as 
the defendant made "two more quick hand movements, each time apparently placing 
more objects into her mouth." Id. After apprehending the defendant, the agents, twenty 
minutes later, took her to a local hospital to retrieve the objects the defendant had 
swallowed. Id After attempting to insert a rubber tube down the defendant's nose and 
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esophagus, the defendant agreed to drink the emetic solution allowing the officers to 
retrieve seven balloons of heroin. IcL_ at 626-27. 
The court determined that although "there clearly was probable cause to believe 
that the defendant had swallowed packages containing heroin, there was no [exigency] 
justifying the intrusion into her body." Id. at 628. So although there was a "'clear 
indication' that the defendant probably swallowed balloons of heroin,. . . there was no 
substantial reason to believe that evidence would be destroyed." IdL. at 630-31; Hodson, 
907 P.2d at 1158. The testimony presented demonstrated that "[t]he rubber container 
would effectively prevent the contents from being absorbed into the system." IcL_ at 631 
(quotations and citations omitted). Because there is a "high statistical probability that the 
balloons would 'pass through,'" the defendant "easily could have been transported to jail 
and placed in an isolation cell and kept under proper surveillance." IcL 
In this case, the state presented evidence regarding the officers' belief on how the 
drugs would be packaged. The officers' testimony can only support a conclusion that 
they believed that if Mr. Alverez was carrying drugs in his mouth, they would be 
packaged in accordance with their prior knowledge and experience. In addition, the state 
presented "no justifiable reason to conduct [a] warrant less search since [the] evidence 
could be retrieved through 'the ordinary processes of nature.'" Palmer, 803 P.2d at 1253 
(citing Bracamonte, 540 P.2d at 631); see also Hodson, 907 P.2dat 1158; compare 
Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770-71 (exigent circumstances exist where percentage of alcohol 
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in blood rapidly dissipates after drinking stops). The state failed to present any evidence 
regarding the officers' belief that if the drugs were swallowed they would be lost or 
destroyed. In fact, the state failed to introduce any evidence about the likelihood that the 
drugs would have been damaged by going through the human digestive tract or that Mr. 
Alverez's health would have been jeopardized. Hodson, 907 P.2d at 1158 (regardless of 
how drugs swallowed are packaged "they are susceptible to identification and recovery in 
supervised, nonviolent post-arrest setting"). 
Therefore, the "exigent circumstances" prong of Schmerber is not satisfied. The 
failure of the state to demonstrate the exigent circumstances prong by at least probable 
cause obviates the need for the Court to address the third prong of Schmerber . Palmer, 
803 P.2d at 1252. Consideration of that prong demonstrates further why suppression is 
appropriate. 
C. The Officers' Method Was Not Reasonable. 
Under the third prong of the Schmerber test, the state must show that the method 
chosen was reasonable and the search was done in a reasonable manner. Schmerber, 384 
U.S. at 771-72. In Winston v. Lee. 470 U.S. 753. 761-62, 105 S. Ct. 1611 (19851 the 
Supreme Court reiterated the need for probable cause showing that evidence will be 
found and that exigent circumstances are sufficient to dispense with the warrant 
requirement. Id at 761. In reviewing Schmerber and the reasonableness prong, the 
Supreme Court articulated a three-part test. The first factor is "the extent to which the 
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procedure may threaten the safety or health of the individual.ff Winston, 470 U.S. at 761; 
Hodson, 907 P.2d 1155, 1157 (Utah 1995). While the Court found that a physician's 
blood draw was permissible because ,K[f]or most people, [a blood test] involves virtually 
no risk, trauma, or pain'" Winston, 470 U.S. at 761 (quoting Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 
771), the Winston Court found that the risks involved in the surgical removal of a bullet 
from the defendant were too great to be reasonable. IcL_ at 764. 
In this case, the officers did not have probable cause to believe that evidence 
would be found and no exigent circumstances, and yet they chose an unreasonable 
method of investigation that involved both pain and risks to Mr. Alverez's health. The 
officers in this case each grabbed Mr. Alverez by one of his arms and put him in a very 
painful wrist lock forcing him to bend forward while ordering him to spit out the 
contents of his mouth. R. 88:7-8, 30-31. This method was not only extremely painful 
but particularly dangerous in light of the officers' belief that Mr. Alverez was attempting 
to swallow balloons of drugs in his mouth. Grabbing Mr. Alverez in such a manner 
created a substantial risk of him aspirating on objects in his mouth. Given the state's 
evidence of the officers' experience with how drugs carried in the mouth are packaged, 
and the nhigh statistical probability that balloons would 'pass through"1 the defendant, 
the officers "easily could have been transported to jail and placed in an isolation cell and 
kept under proper surveillance." Bracamonte, 540 P.2d at 631; Hodson., 907 P.2d at 
1157. 
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The second factor in the reasonableness analysis is "the extent of intrusion upon 
the individual's dignitary interests in personal privacy and bodily integrity." Winston, 
470 U.S. at 761-62; Hodson, 907 P.2d at 1157. The Court noted that searches of 
people's homes and phone conversations, and forcing people to come to the police 
station were neither painful nor physically dangerous, but did impinge on Fourth 
Amendment interests, the "individual's sense of personal privacy and security." 
Winston, 470 U.S. at 762. As stated above, the officers grabbed Mr. Alverez's arms and 
put him in a painful wrist lock, bending him forward in an attempt to prevent him from 
swallowing. Having his body subjected to such physical pain in a public place 
epitomizes conduct that intrudes on one's rights to privacy, bodily integrity and dignitary 
interests. Therefore, the officers conduct was constitutionally unreasonable. 
The final factor in the reasonableness analysis is "the need to preserve evidence of 
criminal behavior." Hodson, 907 P.2d at 1158. Similar to the argument made by the 
state in Hodson, the state argues here that "[t]he justification for the force used in this 
case is the need to preserve evidence and protect defendant from harm." Id_ The 
supreme court rejected the state's argument stating: 
There is considerable indication . . . that drug dealers commonly seek to 
secrete drugs by means of swallowing, and it does not seem likely that they 
would routinely risk their own safety or lives. [ People v. Jones, 257 Cal. 
Rptr. 500, 503 (1989); Statev.Tapp, 353 So.2d 265, 269 (La. 1977)]. . . . 
No emergency or exigency justifies the use offeree . . . to preserve 




The supreme court's determination in Hodson applies equally in this case. The 
state presented no evidence that "might have supported a reasonable fear by the officers 
that swallowing the [balloon wrapped drugs] would render their contents 
nondiscoverable or harmful to defendant." Id_ The state demonstrated no compelling 
need for this search, because they had little more than a hunch that evidence would be 
found at the time of the search, and there were available constitutional methods of 
conducting the search that were ignored. Because the state did not meet its burden to 
justify the warrantless and unreasonable search of Mr. Alverez, all evidence seized as a 
result should be suppressed. Wong Sun v. United States . 371 U.S. 471 (1963). 
CONCLUSION 
The Appellant, Mr. Alverez, respectfully requests this Court to reverse the trial 
court's denial of his motion to suppress, and reverse his conviction. 
SUBMITTED this ^ L d a y of 2 ^ 2 0 0 4 . 
DEBRA M. NELSON 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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FINDING OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Case No. 031904214 
Judge Paul G. Maughn 
THE ABOVE ENTITLED MATTER CAME BEFORE the Court for hearing and 
determination of the Defendant's Motion to Suppress, on August 26, 2003. The Honorable Paul G. 
Maughn presided. The Defendant was present and represented by Steve Shapiro. Kimberly 
McKinnon, Deputy District Attorney for Salt Lake County, represented the State. Based upon the 
memorandums of law submitted and the arguments of counsel presented, and for good cause shown, 
the Court now makes and enters the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On June 24, 2003, Sergeant Chad Steed and Officer Wahlin of the Salt Lake City Police 
P*t 
Department observed a vehicle under suspicion for illegal activities pulling into a j faU*^ 
apartment complex at 2430 S. Elizabeth Street. The officers watched the defendant enter ^ o ^ V 
the complex, and then return shortly after. 
*n 
2. On the initial approach to the defendant's vehicle, Sergeant Steed observed in the center 
console of the defendant's vehicle a bottle of water as well as a facsimile of "Jesus 
Malverde." 
3. When the defendant returned to his vehicle Officer Wahlin talked to the defendant. 
During the course of the conversation, Officer Wahlin asked the defendant if he had 
drugs in his mouth. At that point the defendant made swallowing motions with his 
mouth. Both officers simultaneously watched as the defendant moved objects in his 
mouth and tried to swallow. Officers then each physically grabbed one of the 
defendant's arms and forced him to spit out the balloons containing illegal narcotics. 
FROM THE FOREGOING FINDINGS OF FACT, THE COURT NOW MAKES AND 
ENTERS THE FOLLOWING: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. In the totality of the circumstances, the Officers acted reasonably. 
2. The defendant did not open his mouth and officers clearly observed a crime being 
committed in their immediate presence. 
3. Given the circumstances, a search warrant was not needed. 
4. The Defendant's Motion to Suppress Illegally Obtained Evidence is Denied. 
DATED this f day of fr-X 
Approved as to Form: 
J£,*t?"«£^> 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
KIMBERLY MCKINNON, 8826 
Deputy District Attorney 
231 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-7900 
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Case No. 031904214 
Judge Paul G. MaughHA/ 
Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby ORDERED, 
ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
The Defendant's Motion to Suppress Illegally Obtained Evidence is Denied. 
DATED this -f day ol&Y *?&<& 
BY THE COURT: 
ADDENDUM B 
AMENDMENT IV 
[Unreasonable searches and seizures.] 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and 
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affir-
mation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons 
or things to be seized. 
ARREST, BY WHOM, AND HOW MADE 77-7-15 
77-7-15. Authority of peace officer to stop and question 
suspect — Grounds. 
A peace officer may stop any person in a public place when he has a 
reasonable suspicion to believe he has committed or is in the act of committing 
or is attempting to commit a public offense and may demand his name, address 
and an explanation of his actions. 
History: C. 1953, 77-7-15, enacted by L. 
1980, ch. 15, § 2. 
